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CYBERBULLYING 2.0:
A "SCHOOLHOUSE PROBLEM" GROWS UP
"We worry about terrorists coming into our country and doing us
harm. A victim of bullying walks into [her] school each day know-
ing [her] terrorist could strike any moment and destroy [her]
wounded spirit again, and again."'
"If all cruel teasing led to suicide, the human race would be
extinct." 2
INTRODUCTION
Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old MySpace user, hanged herself
with a belt in October 2006.3 Megan's parents, prosecutors, and the
media quickly determined that Megan's forty-seven-year-old neigh-
bor,4 Lori Drew, had convinced Megan to kill herself in an online
message while pretending to be a high school boy on MySpace.5 Lori
Drew's actions were labeled "cyberbullying," a term that swiftly took
root in the American vernacular. 6 Megan's tragedy made headlines
for weeks, prompting an outcry from irate Americans, many of whom
retaliated against Lori Drew.7 Lori Drew and her family received
death threats and a brick through their kitchen window, photos of
their home spread across the Internet, Lori's voicemail was hacked,
and disturbing Web sites were created by others using her name.8 In
the years that followed, schools began punishing their students' online
speech,9 states passed cyberbullying regulations,10 and the U.S. Con-
gress is now considering the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention
1. BULLY POLICE USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/whyalaw.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
2. Victoria Kim, A Right for Students to Be Cruel Online?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2009, at Al
(quoting UCLA law professor Eugene Volokh).
3. Christopher Maag, MySpace Hoax Draws No Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007, at A22;
Mattathias Schwartz, Malwebolence, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 26.
4. Matthew C. Ruedy, Comment, Repercussions of a MySpace Teen Suicide: Should Anti-
Cyberbullying Laws Be Created?, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 323, 323 (2008).
5. Id. at 323-24.
6. See Christopher Maag, When the Bullies Turned Faceless, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, § 9
(Magazine), at 9.
7. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 26.
8. Id.
9. See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 593 F.3d 286, 290 (3d Cir. 2010),
vacated en banc, No. 08-4138, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 7342 (3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2010).
10. See Ruedy, supra note 4, at 335-39.
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Act (the Cyberbullying Act)." This bill presents a paradox: a future
victim like Lori Drew will be protected, but a future victim like Megan
Meier will not.
The term "cyberbullying" is commonly used to describe acts of chil-
dren harassing and threatening each other online.12 While schools
may debatably punish this child-versus-child scenario while the stu-
dents are on campus,' 3 the Supreme Court has not granted schools
carte blanche to punish off-campus student speech.1 4 This deficiency,
when combined with Internet anonymity' 5 and harassment by
adults,16 renders school-based punishments useless in many scenarios.
Furthermore, cyberbullying is not rare-studies show that between
fifty and seventy-five percent of teens have been bullied online, while
only ten percent have reported this problem to an adult.17
Recently, many states have incorporated cyberbullying into their
state bullying legislation, often by requiring public schools to enforce
traditional bullying punishments when students are using electronic
communications to bully each other." Some states require that
schools report this bullying to local law enforcement, 19 and various
other states have made cyberbullying a crime. 20 In addition to the
11. See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. (2009).
12. See What Is Cyberbullying Exactly?, STOP CYBERBULLYING.ORG, http://www.stopcyber
bullying.org/what-is-cyberbullying-exactly.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
13. See generally Todd D. Erb, Comment, A Case for Strengthening School District Jurisdic-
tion to Punish Off-Campus Incidents of Cyberbullying, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 257 (2008).
14. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007). The Supreme Court in Morse stated,
Under these circumstances, we agree with the superintendent that [a student] cannot
"stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned
activity and claim he is not at school." There is some uncertainty at the outer bounda-
ries as to when courts should apply school speech precedents but not on these facts.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In Morse, a high school student was suspended for
unfurling a large banner that stated "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" while standing across the street
from his school at a school-sanctioned, school-supervised event held during school hours. Id. at
397, 400-01.
15. See Bruce P. Smith, Cybersmearing and the Problem of Anonymous Online Speech, 18
COMM. LAW. 3, 3 (2000); Jodi L. Whitaker & Brad J. Bushman, Online Dangers: Keeping Chil-
dren and Adolescents Safe, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1053, 1061 (2009).
16. See generally Sarah Castle, Comment, Cyberbullying on Trial: The Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act and United States v. Drew, 17 J.L. & PoL'Y 579 (2009).
17. See Half of Teens Cyber Bullied, CONNECT WITH KIDs.coM (Dec. 23, 2009), http://www.
connectwithkids.com/tipsheet/2009/469_dec23/thisweek/091223_bullied.shtml; Tara Parker-Pope,
Parents Often Unaware of Cyber-Bullying, N.Y. TIMES WELL BLOG (Oct. 3, 2008, 10:41 AM),
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/parents-often-unaware-of-cyber-bullying/.
18. See Cyberbullying, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://beta.ncsl.org/
default.aspx?tabid=12903 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
19. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 160.775 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.300.285(5) (2006 &
Supp. 2010).
20. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(a) (Supp. 2009).
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recent rise in state legislation to confront cyberbullying, U.S. Repre-
sentative Linda Sanchez of California has proposed the Cyberbullying
Act,21 a bill that would make cyberbullying a federal crime.22 The bill
proposes fines for cyberbullying, as well as a prison sentence of up to
two years. 23
Due to the recent increase in Internet accessibility, especially
through difficult-to-monitor wireless Internet and mobile phone web
browsers, neither school- nor state-based regulations adequately com-
bat cyberbullying. These school- and state-based regulations ignore
fundamental and complex issues, including Internet anonymity, har-
assment by non-students, state jurisdictional questions, Internet juris-
dictional questions, and Supreme Court decisions that have not
expressly allowed schools to punish off-campus student speech. Part
II of this Comment explores the background and legislative history of
cyberbullying, schools' abilities to punish off-campus speech, and the
federal government's ability to restrict public expression.24 Part III
argues that federal cyberbullying legislation is needed in light of both
state- and school-based enforcement challenges, and federal cyberbul-
lying legislation must be both content neutral and the least restrictive
means of regulating the online transmission of true threats.25 Part III
also examines the Cyberbullying Act, concludes that it is overbroad,
and argues that its goals could be achieved in a constitutional manner
by adding two amendments to the federal crime of stalking.26
II. BACKGROUND
In his book, Chaos: Making a New Science, author James Gleick
argued that what humans see as unpredictable chaos is actually very
ordered, and this order is determined based on the initial conditions
of a series of events. 27 The anonymity of the Internet was its "initial
condition" that eventually allowed for cyberbullying. The creation of
services like Internet Explorer and Netscape-free alternatives to
America Online's software-meant that a computer, modem, and
21. David Kravets, Cyberbully Bill Gets Chilly Reception, WIRED THREAT LEVEL BLOG (Sept.
30, 2009, 6:37 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/09/cyberbullyingbill.
22. Id.
23. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009).
24. See infra notes 27-207 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 208-302 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 303-09 and accompanying text. This Comment does not provide an in-
depth analysis of whether such a revision fits within congressional power under the Commerce
Clause.
27. JAMES GLEICK, CHAOS: MAKING A NEW SCIENCE 15 (1987).
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phone jack became the only requirements to connect to the Internet. 28
Internet users were granted the ability to go online anonymously with-
out identifying their legal names or providing any form of payment
that would force identification.29 Unlocked wireless Internet routers
created the final layer of anonymity, allowing people to access the In-
ternet via their neighbor's or a business's Internet connection without
identifying themselves as the owners of that Internet connection. 30
Pedophiles, hackers, and music thieves found refuge in this
anonymity.31
These developments allowed Internet users to both receive and
transmit data anonymously. 32 This was a major departure from the
real world because, "[a]lthough speakers occasionally remain anony-
mous in the real world, those who insist on speaking anonymously in
public settings are aberrations: the terrorist in a balaclava; the racist
hidden by a white hood .... In cyberspace, by contrast, it is common-
place to speak without disclosing one's true name."33 This anonymity
has given Internet users uninhibited confidence to voice unpopular,
irresponsible, or slanderous statements. 34 Ultimately, the Internet's
initial conditions of free use, widespread accessibility, and anonymity
led to its wildfire growth, establishing a massive audience to receive
these anonymously expressed viewpoints.35
The story of Megan Meier and Lori Drew spawned from Internet
anonymity. Megan Meier, a thirteen-year-old student from Missouri,
became friends on MySpace with a teenage boy known to her as Josh
Evans, who eventually convinced her that he liked her. 3 6 The two car-
ried on an exclusively Internet-based relationship in which Megan
28. See Harry McCracken, 20 Years of AOL Annoyances and Foul-Ups, PC WORLD (Apr.
28, 2009, 8:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/163935/20-years-of-aolannoyances-and
fouldups.html.
29. Barbara Kiviat, Driver's Licenses for the Internet, THE CURIOUS CAPITALIST (Jan. 30,
2010, 5:16 AM), http://curiouscapitalist.blogs.time.com/2010/01/20/drivers-licenses-for-the-Inter
net/.
30. See Rob Ashwell, The Wireless Gateways to Cybercrime, THE GUARDIAN, May 22, 2008, at
3.
31. Id. See also Enigmax, Hackers Undermine Piracy Evidence with Hadopi Router, TOR-
RENTFREAK BLOG (July 9, 2009), http://www.torrentfreak.com/hackers-undermine-piracy-
evidence-with-hadopi-router-090709.
32. Enigmax, supra note 31.
33. Smith, supra note 15, at 4.
34. See id. at 3. Adding further complications, 14% of young adults claim to have been imper-
sonated online. See A THIN LINE, http://www.athinline.org/content/statistics/16/fullhero.image.
jpg?1259780075 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
35. See Smith, supra note 15, at 3-4.
36. Ruedy, supra note 4, at 323-24.
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confided in Josh and Josh cultivated Megan's trust.37 The situation
went sour when Josh suddenly told Megan that he hated her, and
many other MySpace users joined in the bashing of Megan as they
witnessed the relationship collapse.38 Megan was called a "liar" and a
"fat whore," 3 9 and Josh informed Megan that "the world would be a
better place without [her]." 40 Megan told Josh, "You're the kind of
boy a girl would kill herself over," and proceeded to hang herself with
a belt.4 1
In reality, Josh Evans was Lori Drew's online pseudonym. 4 2 Lori
Drew was forty-seven years old, lived on Megan's street, and was the
mother of one of Megan's friends. 4 3 Lori Drew, operating under the
pseudonym of Josh Evans, was accused of harassing Megan Meier to
the point of suicide.4 4 However, before she was even charged with a
crime, Lori discovered the true magnitude of the cyberharrassment
world. The Drew family's e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and
other personal information spread across the Internet.45 With this in-
formation available, the Drew family received death threats and a
brick through their kitchen window.46 Someone changed Lori's cell
phone voicemail greeting to "I did it for the lulz" 4 7 and someone
posted online a blog titled Megan Had It Coming.48 The blog became
national news, calling the deceased Megan Meier "fat" and a "drama
queen," and the author of the blog falsely identified himself as Lori
Drew.4 9 Some time later, it was discovered that the blog's author was
actually Jason Fortuny, a well-known hacker with no ties to Lori Drew
or Megan Meier.50
37. Id.
38. Maag, supra note 6, at 9.
39. Id.
40. Shira Auerbach, Note, Screening Out Cyberbullies: Remedies for Victims on the Internet
Playground, 30 CARDozo L. REV. 1641, 1641 n.4 (2009) ("The world would be a better place
without you in it.").
41. Jennifer Steinhauer, Arguments in Case Involving Net and Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2008, at A26. See also Schwartz, supra note 3, at 26 ("[Megan] hanged herself with a belt after
receiving cruel messages from a boy she'd been flirting with on MySpace.").
42. See Steinhauer, supra note 41, at A26.
43. Ruedy, supra note 4, at 324.
44. See Steinhauer, supra note 41, at A26.
45. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 26.
46. Id.
47. Id. Lulz is defined as "[a] corruption of 'LOL' . the joy of disrupting another's emo-
tional equilibrium." Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 26-27.
50. Id. Mr. Fortuny informed the New York Times that he authored the Megan Had It Com-
ing Web site. Id. at 27. He reasoned, "What's [anyone going to] sue me for? ... Leading on
confused people? Why don't people fact-check who this stuff is coming from? Why do they
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Prosecutors never found adequate evidence to press criminal
charges against Lori Drew for harassment, stalking, or child endanger-
ment.51 The prosecuting attorney stated, "[Lori Drew's] purpose was
never to cause [Megan] emotional harassment."52 Lori Drew was
charged with "accessing a computer involved in interstate or foreign
communication without authorization or in excess of authorization to
obtain information in furtherance of the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress," although a jury found her not guilty.53 The
same jury did, however, find Lori guilty on three misdemeanor counts
of violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, essentially a crime of
violating MySpace's terms of service. 54 This verdict was widely criti-
cized 55 and was overturned when the district court granted Drew's
motion to set aside the jury's verdict.56
A. States and Schools Begin Punishing Online Speech
Ron Meier, Megan Meier's father, stated that he was "furious and
heartbroken" to hear that no criminal charges would stand against
Lori Drew.57 Others agreed58 and created anti-cyberbullying organi-
zations like Bully Police USA 59 and STOP Cyberbullying 60 to pro-
mote cyberbullying education and legislative reform.61
assume it's true?" Id. No charges were filed against Mr. Fortuny. Id. Those who now visit the
Megan Had It Coming blog find a non-functional link to a YouTube video titled "Megan Got
Rickrolled." See The Final Story, MEGAN HAD IT COMING (Dec. 9, 2007, 9:26 PM), http://megan
haditcoming.blogspot.com/2007/12/final-story.html.
51. See Maag, supra note 6, at A22.
52. Id.
53. United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 453 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
54. Id. at 452-53, 461.
55. See, e.g., Brian Stelter, Guilty Verdict in Cyberbullying Case Provokes Many Questions
over Online Identity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2008, at A28; William Tasch, "MySpace Mom" Asks
Court Not to Stretch Federal Crime Beyond Congress' Intent, 14 PuB. Ir. L. REP. 172 (2009);
Ryan Patrick Murray, Comment, Myspace-ing Is Not a Crime: Why Breaching Terms of Service
Agreements Should Not Implicate the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 29 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.
REv. 475 (2008).
56. See Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 468.
57. Maag, supra note 6, at A22.
58. See Sarah Jameson, Comment, Cyberharassment: Striking a Balance Between Free Speech
and Privacy, 17 ComMLAW CONSPECTUS 231, 231-32 (2008) ("The local and national television
news and talk radio shows broadcast the story, and bloggers wrote about it. ... Some wanted
legislation; others wanted blood.").
59. BULLY POLICE USA, supra note 1.
60. STOP CYBERBULLYING, http://www.stopcyberbullying.org (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
61. BULLY POLICE USA, supra note 1. MTV took a less orthodox approach, offering $10,000
to the user who suggested the most helpful way to end cyberbullying. See Redraw the Line
Challenge, MTV's A THIN LINE, http://www.athinline.org/challenge (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
[Vol. 60:141146
CYBERBULLYING 2.0
In response to the Megan Meier incident and other instances when
cyberbullying victims committed suicide, 62 public school administra-
tors throughout the country began to punish their students for off-
campus Internet speech.63 One school suspended an eighth-grade stu-
dent for uploading a video to YouTube.64 This video depicted several
eighth-grade students insulting one of their peers, calling her
"spoiled," a "brat," and a "slut." 6 5 The video was filmed and
uploaded off campus, prompting an onslaught of derogatory text
messages directed at the victim. 6 6 The offender appealed her suspen-
sion, and a federal court in Los Angeles held that this school's punish-
ment violated the student's First Amendment rights.67 Other schools
have also punished off-campus electronic communication: one school
punished a student for e-mailing a "degrading top-ten list" which
rated his classmates, 68 another school punished a student who made a
fake obituary Web site while off campus, 69 and another school pun-
ished a student for an article posted on his personal Web site while off
campus. 70 A school in Seattle, Washington suspended between twenty
and thirty students for joining a club on Facebook that spoke nega-
tively about a classmate.7'
Coinciding with this influx of punishment for cyber speech, various
courts began cracking the venerable wall of Internet anonymity. A
trial court in New York ordered Google (the owner of the blog Blog-
ger)7 2 to expose the identity of Rosemary Port, the famous-though
previously anonymous-author of the Skanks in NYC blog, after a
model sued the anonymous blogger for calling her a "ho" and a
"skank."73 Similarly, the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, or-
62. See Susan Donaldson James, Immigrant Teen Taunted by Cyberbullies Hangs Herself,
ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 26, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=9660938.
63. Matthew Schiffhauer, Uncertainty at the "Outer Boundaries" of the First Amendment: Ex-
tending the Arm of School Authority Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into Cyberspace, 24 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 731 (2010).




68. Killion v. Franklin Reg'1 Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 455 (W.D. Pa. 2001).
69. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist. No. 415, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1090 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
70. Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998).
71. Elisa Hahn, Dozens of Students Suspended for Facebook Cyberbullying, NORTH WEST
CABLE NEWS (Jan. 14, 2010, 11:39 PM), http://www.nwcn.com/news/washington/More-than-20-
students-suspended-for-FB-cyberbullying-81629692.html.
72. BLOGGER: ABOUT Us, http://www.blogger.com/about (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
73. See George Rush, Blogger Sez It's Yer (H)Own Fault, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 23, 2009, at
H1.
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dered a local newspaper's Web host to identify an anonymous com-
menter who posted on the newspaper's Web site.74
Critics were quick to attack these punishments and publicized expo-
sures.7 5 Northwestern University law professor Martin Redish stated,
"[An Internet poster] should be allowed anonymity unless [he or she
is] threatening a crime or really obviously defaming someone."76
Other critics argued that schools should be "informally involved" with
cyberbullying prevention, but any attempt to define "disruptive be-
havior" would be a slippery slope,77 potentially punishing everything
from heated online disagreements to old-fashioned "trolling" 78-the
process of annoying other Internet users for no good reason.79 Some
also maintained that punishing students for incidents similar to the
video on YouTube overstepped constitutional limits on where schools
may punish behavior and what speech schools may punish.80 Ulti-
mately, critics maintain that "[s]tudents . . . have a [First] Amendment
right to be nasty in cyberspace."8 '
States began passing anti-cyberbullying legislation to establish uni-
formity regarding the types of electronic communication that schools
may punish, and since the Megan Meier tragedy, thirty states have
amended their statutes to cover online harassment.82 Six of these
74. See Jamie Sotonoff, Judge: Reveal Who Posted Nasty Comment, DAILY HERALD, Oct. 2,
2009, at 19. This court ordered disclosure as part of pre-suit discovery. Id. Lisa Stone, village
trustee of Buffalo Grove, Illinois, filed a petition for pre-suit discovery after the Web site com-
menter posted negative comments about her teenage son. Id.
75. Id. See also James Tucker, Free Speech and "Cyber-Bullying," ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS
(Jan. 16, 2008, 10:29 AM), http:lwww.aclu.org/2008/01/16/free-speech-and-cyber-bullying/.
Rosemary Port sued Google for exposing her identity. See Paul Thompson, Blogger Who Called
Vogue Model a 'Skank' Sues Google for $15Million for Unmasking Her, MAIL ONLINE (Aug. 25,
2009, 1:34 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1207669/Rosemary-Port-
sues-Googe-15million-Liskula-Cohen-skank-blog-unmasking.html. Likewise, both the Electronic
Frontier Foundation and the Media Freedom and Information Access Practicum at Yale Law
School filed amicus briefs with the Illinois Court of Appeals in an attempt to stop the identifica-
tion of the Illinois newspaper's online commenter. See Dissent, EFF to Court: Block Unmasking
of Anonymous Online Critic, POGOWAsRIGHT.ORG (Mar. 15, 2010), http:///www.pogowasright.
org/?p=8330#more-8330.
76. Sotonoff, supra note 74, at 19.
77. Kathleen Fitzgerald, Bills to Curb Cyber-Bullying Raise Free-Speech Concerns, STUDENT
PRESS LAW CENTER (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.splc.org/news/newsflash.asp?id=1679.
78. Giving further credence to the evolution of the Internet, "old-fashioned" (circa the late
1980s) trolling, or simply annoying others online, has evolved into modern trolling-macro-scale
organized humiliation of others-a change "from [an] ironic solo skit to vicious group hunt."
Schwartz, supra note 3, at 26.
79. See id. at 28-29.
80. See Kim, supra note 2, at Al; Tucker, supra note 75.
81. Kim, supra note 2, at Al.
82. See Sameer Hinduja & Justin Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws 1 (July 2010) (unpub-
lished study), available at www.cyberbullying.us. Thirty states have statutes against both bullying
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states use the term "cyberbullying." 8 3 Most states have a bullying law
that schools must enforce, and thirty add that harassment can also
take place electronically. 84 At least three state statutes say that
cyberbullying must occur on campus or at school-sponsored
activities.85
Certain states have created very specific cyberbullying statutes.86
Iowa only punishes cyberbullying that is "based on [a victim's] actual
or perceived trait or characteristic . . . which creates an objectively
hostile school environment."8 7 The statute offers a list of characteris-
tics that qualify, "includ[ing], but . .. not limited to age, color, creed,
national origin, race, religion, marital status, sex, sexual orientation,
gender identity, physical attributes, physical or mental ability or disa-
bility, ancestry, political party preference, political belief, socioeco-
nomic status, or familial status."88
A few states have passed cyberbullying legislation that requires
both police involvement and criminal punishments.89 North Caro-
lina's statute, which makes cyberbullying a criminal misdemeanor,
provides that punishable cyberbullying includes certain instances of
online impersonation, soliciting others to post "private, personal, or
sexual" content relating to minors, posting or stealing data about a
minor with the intent of harassment, repeatedly using a computer to
harass a minor, and various other offenses.90 The statute states that
any person over eighteen years old who violates this law may face six
and online harassment. As of July 2010, Colorado, Hawaii, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, North




85. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATUREs, supra note 18.
86. See id.
87. IOWA CODE § 280.28(2)(b) (1996 & Supp. 2010).
88. IowA CODE § 280.28(2)(c).
89. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 18.
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(a) (Supp. 2009). Under the North Carolina statute, punisha-
ble cyberbullying occurs
[when] any person [uses] a computer or computer network to do any of the following:
(1) With the intent to intimidate or torment a minor: a. Build a fake profile or Web site;
b. Pose as a minor in: 1. An Internet chat room; 2. An electronic mail message; or 3. An
instant message; c. Follow a minor online or into an Internet chat room; or d. Post or
encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual information per-
taining to a minor.
(2) With the intent to intimidate or torment a minor or the minor's parent or guardian:
a. Post a real or doctored image of a minor on the Internet; b. Access, alter, or erase
any computer network, computer data, computer program, or computer software, in-
cluding breaking into a password protected account or stealing or otherwise accessing
passwords; or c. Use a computer system for repeated, continuing, or sustained elec-
tronic communications, including electronic mail or other transmissions, to a minor.
2010]1 149
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or more months imprisonment, and any person under eighteen years
old who violates the statute may face from thirty days to six months of
imprisonment.91 Two parts of this statute require a mens rea of "in-
tent," 92 one part requires "purpose,"93 and other sections-those that
criminalize planting statements online that provoke third-party har-
assment of a minor and registering minors for pornographic Web sites,
junk e-mail, and instant messages-have no specified mens rea.9 4
Moreover, registering a minor for junk e-mail and instant messages is
only a crime if it results in "intimidation or torment of the minor." 95
Missouri, the home state of Megan Meier and Lori Drew, updated
its harassment statute to confront cyberbullying in 2008.96 Missouri's
statute requires that public schools inform law enforcement when stu-
dent harassment occurs, including when a student "knowingly fright-
ens, intimidates, or causes emotional distress to another [student]"
online or by phone. 97 Prosecutors may then press criminal charges
against the cyberbully.98 Most importantly, Missouri's legislation is
not limited to schools. 99 In the first three months following the sign-
ing of this legislation, Missouri officials brought cyberbullying charges
(3) Plant any statement, whether true or false, tending to provoke or that actually pro-
vokes any third party to stalk or harass a minor.
(4) Copy and disseminate, or cause to be made, an unauthorized copy of any data
pertaining to a minor for the purpose of intimidating or tormenting that minor (in any
form, including, but not limited to, any printed or electronic form of computer data,
computer programs, or computer software residing in, communicated by, or produced
by a computer or computer network).
(5) Sign up a minor for a pornographic Internet site.
(6) Without authorization of the minor or the minor's parent or guardian, sign up a
minor for electronic mailing lists or to receive junk electronic messages and instant
messages, resulting in intimidation or torment of the minor.
Id.
91. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(b). Minors (those under eighteen years of age) who plead
guilty or are found guilty of cyberbullying may, at the court's discretion, be placed on probation





96. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.090(1), (3) (1999 & Supp. 2010); see also Missouri: Cyberbullying
Law Is Signed, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2008, at A16.
97. Mo. REV. STAT. § 160.261(2)(24) (referencing § 565.090). Washington State's cyberbully-
ing statute takes a slightly different approach from the statute in Missouri, giving Washington
school administrators the option of making contacting police part of its official policy. WASH.
REV. CODE § 28A.300.285(5) (2006).
98. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.090(2).
99. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 565.090, 565.225. Harassment of this nature is a crime when any




against seven individuals.100 Several of these individuals faced charges
for sending threats and harassment via text message, and at least one
individual was charged with sending threats through e-mail.101 Only
one case involved students quarrelling among classmates. 102 Missouri
officials also arrested a ninth-grade student when school administra-
tors informed police that she created a vulgarly titled Web site to de-
grade one of her classmates.10 3
B. The Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act
In the wake of these conflicting state cyberbullying punishments
and the increased public interest in the problem, California Represen-
tative Linda Sanchez proposed House Bill 1966, the Megan Meier
Cyberbullying Prevention Act (the Cyberbullying Act). 104 If it is en-
acted, this bill would criminalize cyberbullying and provide penalties
of fines and up to two years in prison.10 5 In an editorial defending the
Cyberbullying Act, Representative Sanchez explained her logic:
Laws criminalize similar behavior when it takes place in person, but
not online. In fact, we have laws criminalizing stalking, sexual har-
assment, identity theft and more when it takes place in person and
online. All of these actions have consequences. But there is one
serious online offense that has no penalty-cyberbullying. Do we
not think it is as serious because it takes place in cyberspace and not
face to face?o
Representative Sanchez likewise discussed the lack of state action,
concerns relating to the threatening of children in general, and the
issue of Internet anonymity. 0 7
The Cyberbullying Act offers a finding of facts, providing a brief
explanation of the type and scope of the harm caused by cyberbully-
ing. 08 This finding of facts cites the high number of children who
100. Kim Zetter, Prosecutors Charge 7 People Under New Cyberbullying Law, WIRED




103. Kim Zetter, Teen Arrested for Creating Website to Bully Other Teen, WIRED THREAT
LEVEL BLOG (Oct. 15, 2009, 3:07 PM), htip://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10fbully/.
104. See Kravets, supra note 21.
105. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009).
106. Linda Sanchez, Protecting Victims, Preserving Freedoms, HUFFINGTON POST BLOG (May
6, 2009, 5:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rep-linda-sanchez/protecting-victims-preser
b_198079.html ("According to a study by the United States Secret Service, being bullied is a risk
factor for perpetrators of school violence, such as the kind that was unleashed with tragic results
at Columbine High School in Colorado.").
107. Id.
108. H.R. 1966 § 2.
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have access to the Internet, the prevalence of cyberbullying on social
networking Web sites, the anonymity provided by the Internet, the
emotional distress tied to online victimization, and the psychological,
academic, and occasionally physical harm that results from cyberbully-
ing.109 The Cyberbullying Act also explains that "[s]ixty percent of
mental health professionals who responded to [a survey] report having
treated at least one patient with a problematic Internet experience in
the previous five years; 54 percent of these clients were 18 years of age
or younger." 10 Thus, the Cyberbullying Act contends that cyberbul-
lying's harm is both noticeable and widespread."'1
The bill proposes that one is guilty of cyberbullying if he or she
"transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication, with
the intent to coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional
distress to a person, using electronic means to support severe, re-
peated, and hostile behavior."11 2 Thus, federally criminalized
cyberbullying would be a specific intent crime. The bill defines elec-
tronic means as "including email, instant messaging, blogs, Web sites,
telephones, and text messages." 113
Representative Sanchez's bill faced a cold reception from Republi-
cans and Democrats alike in the House Subcommittee on Crime, Ter-
rorism, and Homeland Security. 114 Representative Louie Gohmert
stated that the Cyberbullying Act "appears to be another chapter of
over-criminalization," contending that if this legislation becomes law,
"[a] good prosecutor could indict a ham sandwich."115 The Subcom-
mittee did not take further action on Sanchez's proposal during the
111th Congress.116
Passing the Cyberbullying Act will be an uphill battle. Congress
ignored Representative Sanchez's previous cyberbullying bill.117
When Congress has enacted regulations on speech, the Supreme
Court has subsequently found many of them unconstitutional. 118 The
Deleting Online Predators Act, for example, would have monitored
children on the Internet and blocked them from chat rooms while at
109. Id. § 2(1)-(5).
110. Id. § 2(6).
111. See generally id.
112. Id. § 3(a).
113. Id.
114. Kravets, supra note 21.
115. Id.
116. See 111th Congress H.R. 1966, BILL SUMMARY & STATUS, http://thornas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/
bdquery/z?d111:h.r.01966: (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
117. See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 6123, 110th Cong. (2008).
118. Barbara A. Sanchez, United States v. American Library Association: The Choice Be-
tween Cash and Constitutional Rights, 38 AKRON L. REV. 463, 465-69 (2005).
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school unless they were under adult supervision. 119 The bill was never
enacted.120 The Communications Decency Act of 1996,121 the Child
Pornography Prevention Act,122 and the Child Online Protection Act
were all enacted into federal law and later found unconstitutional. 123
The rationale expressed by the Supreme Court in these cases largely
mirrors the logic of Judge Dalzell of the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who wrote, "As the most par-
ticipatory form of mass speech yet developed, the Internet deserves
the highest protection from governmental intrusion."124 Thus, Repre-
sentative Sanchez will need to limit the scope of any cyberbullying
legislation to preserve constitutionally protected speech.
The Cyberbullying Act does not limit itself to purely school-related
issues.125 Megan Meier's school could not have suspended or expelled
Lori Drew because Lori was not a student.126 However, recent cases
have shown schools expanding their authority and punishing online
student behavior occurring off campus.127 To determine whether or
not cyberbullying may be discouraged through schoolhouse punish-
ments, one must first examine what constitutes a schoolhouse prob-
lem. One must also ask whether legislation already exists that
achieves the same purposes of the Cyberbullying Act outside of
school grounds.
C. The Supreme Court Has Limited the Speech a
School May Regulate
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
several students claimed that their school had wrongfully suspended
them for wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.128 The
Supreme Court held that these students were within their rights to
119. Mary B. Kibble, Comment, Fear Mongering, Filters, the Internet and the First Amend-
ment: Why Congress Should Not Pass Legislation Similar to the Deleting Online Predators Act, 13
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 497, 515 (2008).
120. Id. at 526.
121. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882-83 (1997) (striking down the Communications De-
cency Act except as it pertains to obscene and indecent materials and acknowledging that,
through the statute's severability clause, these two forms of speech may remain regulated be-
cause they are not protected by the First Amendment).
122. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 253, 258 (2002).
123. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 673 (2004) (stating that the Child Online Protection
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231, was unconstitutional because the government did not prove that the pro-
posed regulations were the least restrictive means of reaching the government's goals).
124. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
125. See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. (2009).
126. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 26.
127. See Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir. 2004).
128. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504-05 (1969).
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wear the armbands at school,' 29 stating, "It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."' 30 The Court rea-
soned that any speech might cause trouble or start an argument, but
the Constitution protects this "hazardous freedom" as the basis for
our national strength.1'3 Thus,
[w]hen [the student] is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on
the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opin-
ions . . . if he does so without "materially and substantially in-
terfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school" and without colliding with the rights of
others.132
Later Supreme Court opinions refined the Tinker holding and ap-
plied it to a variety of situations. In Bethel School District v. Fraser,
the Supreme Court held that, while public school students have a right
to free speech at school, it is not equal to an adult's right to free
speech in other settings. 33 Schools may ban sexually explicit, inde-
cent, or lewd speech 34 and may also restrict speech that a listener or
reader might reasonably believe expresses the school's own views.135
Schools may not, however, simply "suppress 'expressions of feelings
with which they do not wish to contend'"-as seen previously in
Tinker.136
In 2007, the Supreme Court held in Morse v. Frederick that schools
are allowed to ban speech and punish students for language that pro-
motes illegal drug use or runs contrary to other school policies, even
allowing a school to punish a student for acts occurring off the
school's physical campus.137 In Morse, a student was suspended for
holding a banner bearing the slogan "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS" at an
off-campus, school-sponsored event that occurred during school
hours.138 The Supreme Court found both the time of the event and
the school's endorsement of this off-campus activity dispositive, stat-
ing, "There is some uncertainty at the outer boundaries as to when
courts should apply school speech precedents . . . but not on these
129. Id. at 514.
130. Id. at 506.
131. Id. at 508-09.
132. Id. at 512-13 (alteration in original) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th
Cir. 1966)).
133. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
134. Id. at 687.
135. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).
136. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749).
137. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408-10 (2007).
138. Id. at 400-01.
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facts." 139 The Court held that a school can punish drug-promoting
speech that occurs at a school-supervised and school-endorsed event
held during school hours. 140 The Court, however, clearly stated that
uncertainty remains over when a school may punish off-campus
speech, and it did not attempt to resolve this confusion. 14 1
The Supreme Court has expressly defined a limited realm of school
authority to punish speech. The Court granted schools the right to
punish speech that may substantially and materially interfere with the
operation of a school.142 Sexual, lewd, drug-promoting, and vulgar
speech all falls within this definition.143 A school may also punish
speech that occurs at an off-campus, school-sponsored event during
school hours.144
D. Ignoring the Schoolhouse Gate: The 2006 Amendments to the
Federal Crime of Stalking
Interstate stalking became a federal crime in September of 1996.145
The crime originally required a person to cross state lines "with the
intent to injure or harass another person, and in the course of, or as a
result of, such travel place[ ] that person in reasonable fear of . . .
death . .. or serious bodily injury" either to that person or a member
of his immediate family.146 In recent years this statute has been modi-
fied to accommodate the realities of modern-day stalking, with the
language broadened through several amendments in 2000.147
This statute was again amended in 2006 with the express purpose of
preventing "cyberstalking."1 48 Three major revisions were added.
First, the statute no longer requires interstate travel, instead allowing
stalking through mail or "any interactive computer service."149 Sec-
ond, the statute now criminalizes placing another person "under sur-
139. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
140. Id. ("Under these circumstances, we agree with the superintendent that Frederick cannot
'stand in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned activity and
claim he is not at school.'" (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
141. Id.; see also Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n.22 (5th Cir. 2004).
142. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969) (quoting
Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
143. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408-10 (2007); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
144. Morse, 551 U.S. at 400-01.
145. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (Supp. 11 1994), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006).
146. Id.





veillance with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate."150
Finally, Congress expanded the statute's wording to criminalize en-
gagement in a "course of conduct that . . . causes substantial emo-
tional harm."151
The pertinent portion of the statute now reads,
Whoever ... with the intent .. . to place a person in another State or
tribal jurisdiction, or within the special maritime and territorial ju-
risdiction of the United States, in reasonable fear of the death of, or
serious bodily injury to [that person or that person's family] uses the
mail, any interactive computer service, or any facility of interstate
or foreign commerce to engage in a course of conduct that causes
substantial emotional distress to that person or places that person in
reasonable fear of the death of, or serious bodily injury1 52
to that person or that person's family shall be found guilty of stalking.
The Supreme Court has not had occasion to decide whether these re-
visions adhere to the First Amendment.
E. Constitutional Limitations on Public Speech
When speech occurs outside of the school institution, any govern-
ment restrictions on this speech must be analyzed under a different set
of guidelines.' 53 A criminal regulation of speech must be content neu-
tral;154 Must only target true threats, 155 "fighting words," or speech
that is lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, or insulting;156 and must be
the least restrictive method of achieving the government's ends.157
Therefore, a cyberbullying statute must follow these constitutional
strictures.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the defendant was convicted of
violating a state law that prohibited speaking offensive, derisive, or
annoying words to another person in a street or public place.'58 The
defendant called a public official on the street a "God damned racket-
eer" and "a damned fascist."159 Holding New Hampshire's law valid,
the Supreme Court stated that lewd, obscene, profane, libelous, insult-




153. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
154. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986).
155. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003).
156. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
157. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).




injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"-can con-
stitutionally be regulated.160
The Supreme Court's ruling in Chaplinsky, like its ruling in Tinker,
has been explained, refined, and narrowed in subsequent opinions. In
Watts v. United States, a speaker was convicted for threatening the
President's life when at a rally he stated, "If [the government] ever
make[s] me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is
L.B.J."' 6 1 Overturning his conviction, the Court held that only true
threats may be criminalized.162 The threat in Watts was held not to be
a true threat because it was made in the political arena (where dia-
logue is often heated), it was expressly conditional, and it brought
about no dangerous reaction from its listeners.163 The Court in Watts
did not define a true threat nor create a test for it.164 Instead, the
Court simply stated that these specific circumstances did not consti-
tute a true threat.165
Beyond counteracting threats, regulations on speech must be con-
tent neutral. In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Playtime Thea-
tres challenged the constitutionality of a city zoning ordinance that
restricted the building and operating of adult movie theaters within
one thousand feet of a residential zone, home, church, park, or
school.166 The Court held that the city's zoning ordinance was consti-
tutional because it imposed only a content neutral time, place, and
manner regulation.167 The Court required that any ordinance of this
nature must serve a substantial government interest and not unreason-
ably limit alternative avenues of communication.168
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul1 69 and Virginia v. Black, 70 the Supreme
Court narrowed the types of threats and intimidation that may be con-
stitutionally proscribed. 171 The Court in R.A. V. held that a St. Paul,
Minnesota city ordinance criminalizing the display of a symbol that
"arouses anger, alarm or resentment .. . on the basis of race, color,
160. Id. at 572-73.
161. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969).
162. See id. at 708.
163. Id.
164. Leigh Noffsinger, Comment, Wanted Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and the First Amend-
ment: Distinguishing True Threats from Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1209,
1216 (1999).
165. Watts, 394 U.S. at 708.
166. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1986).
167. Id. at 46.
168. Id. at 47.
169. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
170. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
171. See Black, 538 U.S. at 343; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377.
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creed, religion or gender" was facially invalid under the First Amend-
ment.172 Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that states could
not constitutionally criminalize a certain type of speech (here "fight-
ing words") based solely on protecting certain groups (here "race,
color, creed, religion or gender"). 173 The Court made it clear that
"[t]he First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored sub-
jects." 174 As such, the government may not regulate speech based on
hostility or favoritism towards a nonproscribable message in the
speech, a rule the city of St. Paul violated by singling out "race, color,
creed, religion or gender" in its harassment statute.175
In Virginia v. Black, the Court found a city ordinance outlawing
cross burning to be constitutional, in part because the ordinance did
not explicitly state a basis of protecting certain groups or people with
certain characteristics.176 The Supreme Court stated that true threats
and intimidation may only be banned when the speaker "means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals." 177
Given the nature and history of cross burning in Virginia, the court
held that cross burning constituted both intimidation and a true
threat.178
The Supreme Court has established an additional constitutionality
test for instances in which Internet speech is restricted. In both United
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group'79 and Ashcroft v. ACLU,180
the Court held that any regulation of electronic communication must
be the least restrictive means of achieving the government's goals.' 1
In Playboy, a federal "signal bleed" law required cable operators to
either scramble or fully limit sexually explicit programming during
certain hours of the day because the signal from those channels would
172. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 380, 391 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 391. The Court explained,
Displays containing abusive invective, no matter how vicious or severe, are permissible
unless they are addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics. Those who wish to
use "fighting words" in connection with other ideas-to express hostility, for example,





176. Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
177. Id. at 359.
178. Id. at 359-60.
179. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000).
180. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004).
181. Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 670; Playboy, 529 U.S. at 814.
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occasionally "bleed" onto other channels visible to children and non-
subscribers.182 The Court found the statute unconstitutional, even
though it was narrowly tailored to confront a small problem, 83 be-
cause the government did not show that this law was the least restric-
tive means of achieving the government's ends.184 The Court stated,
"A court should not assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative
would be ineffective; and a court should not presume parents, given
full information, will fail to act."' 85 In this case, the Court stated that
customers could call their cable operators and have the signal bleed
channels blocked, which would be a less restrictive alternative. 186
More recently, in Ashcroft, the Court used the least restrictive
means test as a basis for overturning the Child Online Protection
Act. 87 This act established fines for posting material "harmful to mi-
nors" online for commercial purposes without requiring a credit card
or other "reasonable measures" of age identification. 8 8 The Court
explained that the government had the burden of showing that any
less restrictive alternatives would also be less effective.189 In this case,
a government commission found that filters are actually more effec-
tive than age verification requirements; thus, the government failed to
meet its burden.190
In these cases, the Supreme Court defined the parameters for when
the government may regulate certain forms of public speech. Prohibi-
tions on threatening speech are only valid when used against true
threats. 191 The government may regulate speech with content neutral
time, place, and manner restrictions if they pass intermediate scru-
tiny.192 Speech may be regulated based on its type, but not based on
its content.193 Finally, any restrictions on electronic communication
must be the least restrictive means available to protect against harm-
ful speech.194
182. Playboy, 529 U.S. at 806.
183. See id. at 816.
184. Id. at 827.
185. Id. at 824.
186. Id. at 816-17, 823.
187. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666, 670 (2004).
188. Id. at 662.
189. Id. at 666.
190. Id. at 668.
191. See Watts v. United States. 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
192. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
193. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
194. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000).
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F. The Problem of Overbreadth
Even when legislation restricts constitutionally suppressible speech
in a content neutral manner, the Supreme Court will occasionally
strike down legislation on account of overbreadth.195 The Court has
stated,
[W]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech .. . the transcendent
value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing "attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the
requisite narrow specificity."1 96
The overbreadth doctrine has been called "strong medicine," as it al-
lows citizens to challenge legislation even when their own conduct was
illegal; thus the Court will apply it "only as a last resort" when the
overbreadth is "substantial."' 9 7
In United States v. Stevens, an illustrative case on the subject of
overbreadth, the Supreme Court struck down a statute that criminal-
ized the creation, sale, and possession of depictions of animal cru-
elty.198 This statute was primarily created to prosecute creators of
"crush videos," a type of sexual fetish video in which women viciously
maim small, living animals.199 This statute carried exemptions for cer-
tain depictions of cruelty (for example, videos of cruelty that carried
journalistic, religious, or historical significance). 200 In Stevens, the
Court was asked to apply this legislation to videos of dogfighting.201
The Court explained that, while the act of dogfighting itself is illegal
in all fifty states, criminalizing "speech" that depicts dogfighting and
animal cruelty generally is overbroad.202 The Court stated, "[A] law
195. See, e.g., Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 503-04 (1985).
196. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1972) (quoting Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 486 (1965)).
197. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 613 (1973)).
198. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1582, 1592 (2010) (finding 18 U.S.C. § 48
unconstitutional).
199. Id. at 1598. The Court stated,
All 50 States and the District of Columbia have enacted statutes prohibiting animal
cruelty. But before the enactment of [18 U.S.C.] § 48, the underlying conduct depicted
in crush videos was nearly impossible to prosecute .... [T]he faces of the women
inflicting the torture in the material often were not shown, nor could the location of the
place where the cruelty was being inflicted or the date of the activity be ascertained
from the depiction." Thus, law enforcement authorities often were not able to identify
the parties responsible for the torture.
Id. (citations omitted).
200. Id. at 1582-83.
201. Id. at 1583.
202. Id. at 1583, 1586.
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may be invalidated as overbroad if 'a substantial number of its appli-
cations are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly
legitimate sweep.'" 2 03 The Court expressed concern that this statute
criminalized videos of "wounded . . . or killed" animals, which does
not require cruelty and could criminalize a wide array of non-cruel
conduct. 204 Likewise, the statement that the recorded conduct needed
to be illegal created concern because states criminalize a variety of
actions relating to animals-ranging from endangered species protec-
tion to Washington D.C.'s blanket ban on hunting.205
The Court refused to rely on the canon of constitutional avoidance,
stating, "We 'will not rewrite a ... law to conform it to constitutional
requirements,' for doing so would constitute a 'serious invasion of the
legislative domain,' and sharply diminish Congress's 'incentive to draft
a narrowly tailored law in the first place.' "20 6 The Court stated that to
construe this legislation narrowly, as the government advocated,
would require it to be rewritten, not reinterpreted. 207 Thus, the num-
ber of possible unconstitutional applications of this law made the stat-
ute unconstitutionally broad.
III. ANALYSIS
Cyberbullying causes harm through psychological depression, dam-
aged academic performance, and even (albeit rarely) inciting murder
or suicide.20 8 Cyberbullying's harm is not isolated to a small set of
victims. 209 It must be noted, however, that a great deal of speech can
arguably cause harm, yet remains constitutionally protected. 210 As
such, the question to resolve is not whether cyberbullying causes
harm, but whether the government can constitutionally forbid the
speech that causes this harm. To combat cyberbullying's harm, the
federal government can and should criminalize the most egregious in-
stances of cyberbullying.
203. Id. at 1587 (quoting Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442,
449 n.6 (2008)).
204. See id. at 1588.
205. Id. at 1588-89.
206. Id. at 1591-92 (alteration in original) (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 884 (1997)).
207. Id. at 1592 ("To read § 48 as the Government desires requires rewriting, not just
reinterpretation.").
208. See Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. § 2(5) (2009)
(discussing the pervasiveness of harm caused by cyberbullying).
209. See Parker-Pope, supra note 17.
210. See Tucker,supra note 75 (discussing the need to protect the rights of Nazis to march in a




In an article discussing the criminalization of online defamation,
Professor Susan M. Brenner wrote,
Criminalizing speech is generally distasteful to Americans be-
cause of our deep reverence for the First Amendment; we tend to
believe an uninhibited marketplace of ideas is one of the best guar-
antees of freedom. Freedom, however, is not inherently inconsis-
tent with restrictions; every society necessarily outlaws behaviors
that "harm" others and, in so doing, threaten the elemental fabric of
social order. 211
In certain situations, cyberbullying significantly harms others and thus
threatens the "elemental fabric of social order."212 In light of the
harm presented, a federal cyberbullying regulation is needed to com-
bat both jurisdictional discrepancies, fill in the gaps left by school dis-
cipline, account for non-student cyberbullying, and establish fair rules
that account for Internet predators, Internet pranksters, and Internet
victims. To be constitutional, a federal cyberbullying regulation must
be content neutral, 213 limited to combating true threats,214 and the
least restrictive method of achieving the government's ends.215 The
Cyberbullying Act is content neutral, but its content neutrality comes
with a price: overbreadth. However, federal criminalization remains
the least restrictive means available to create a uniform and enforcea-
ble prohibition against the worst instances of cyberbullying. This fed-
eral crime already exists, and it is called cyberstalking.
A. The Cyberbullying Act and the Cyberstalking Statute
Are Content Neutral
First, any constitutional cyberbullying legislation must be content
neutral. Under the Court's decisions in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,216
and Virginia v. Black,217 a content neutral cyberbullying statute could
criminalize certain types of speech, but not content.218 Because fight-
ing words, intimidation, obscenities, and defamation all qualify as
types of speech that may be constitutionally regulated, the Supreme
Court has already decided that certain online speech may be limited
211. Susan W. Brenner, Should Online Defamation Be Criminalized?, 76 Miss. L.J. 705,
706-07 (2007).
212. Id. at 707.
213. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see also City of Renton v. Play-
time Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1986).
214. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
215. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004).
216. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 382.
217. Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
218. See Black, 538 U.S. at 363; R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388.
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by statute.219 However, as regulation of speech becomes more spe-
cific, these regulations may only be justified if their "basis . . . consists
entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech is
proscribable." 220
A content neutral cyberbullying statute may not be based on hostil-
ity or favoritism towards any nonproscribable message. 221 In light of
St. Paul's anti-cross-burning statute being found unconstitutional in
R.A. V. because it specifically stated that its purpose was to prohibit
symbols that arouse anger based on "race, color, creed, religion or
gender," 222 and Virginia's anti-cross-burning statute being upheld spe-
cifically because it did not mention any protected faction of people,223
a cyberbullying statute must not single out certain groups of victims
based on their traits and characteristics. 224 For example, Iowa's legis-
lation explicitly protects students from cyberbullying based on their
"actual or perceived traits" and then lists a series of traits, similar to
the city of St. Paul's inclusion of protected groups in its unconstitu-
tional statute.225 For this reason, a federal regulation similar to
Iowa's 2 2 6 would likely be found unconstitutional. The Cyberbullying
Act does not prohibit cyberbullying based on traits of the cyberbully-
ing victim but rather based on the nature of the communication.227
Cyberbullying is defined as transmitting a message "with the intent to
coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a
person, using electronic means to support severe, repeated, and hos-
tile behavior." 228 No specific groups or particular types of speech are
singled out for special protection, making the legislation content
neutral.229
219. See Black, 538 U.S. at 360 ("Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons
with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death."); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 301-02 (1964) ("The imposition of liability for private defamation does not
abridge the freedom of public speech or any other freedom protected by the First Amend-
ment."); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (stating that obscenities may be
proscribed and that "'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace" may be proscribed).
220. Black, 538 U.S. at 382 (quoting R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388).
221. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 393.
222. Id. at 391.
223. Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
224. See id.; R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388.
225. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 380.
226. IowA CODE § 280.28 (Supp. 2010).
227. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009).
228. Id.
229. See Black, 538 U.S. at 362.
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The current federal crime of cyberstalking is likewise content neu-
tral for the same reasons that the Cyberbulling Act is content neutral.
This statute does not prohibit cyberstalking based on traits of the
cyberstalking victim but rather based on the nature of the communica-
tion and the intent of the perpetrator. 230 Like the Cyberbullying Act,
this statute protects no specific groups, nor are any viewpoints dis-
criminated against, and so the statute circumvents the Supreme
Court's concerns in both R.A. V.231 and Black.2 3 2
Both the Cyberbullying Act and the federal cyberstalking statute
are content neutral on their face. They do not single out certain types
of electronic viewpoints while ignoring others, nor do they only pro-
tect certain groups of victims. The Cyberbullying Act's wording, while
vague, is an attempt to regulate cyberbullying in a content neutral
manner. The federal cyberstalking statute achieves the same ends in a
more detailed fashion.
B. The Cyberbullying Act Is Overly Broad and Would Likely
Be Struck Down for Prohibiting Constitutionally Protected
Speech, While the Cyberstalking Statute Is Narrowly
Tailored to Speech that May Be Prohibited
Any threatening or intimidating speech that is regulated by
cyberbullying legislation must constitute a true threat. The true threat
requirement will be a difficult hurdle for cyberbullying legislation-or
any other Internet regulation-to pass. Although the Watts Court
stated that making truly threatening statements is not protected by the
Constitution, 233 the Supreme Court has not created a test for what
constitutes a true threat.234 The Cyberbullying Act will be analyzed
under Virginia v. Black, which found constitutional a law that pros-
cribes language "where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group
of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm
or death."235
Although it was morally repugnant when Lori Drew told Megan
Meier that "[t]he world would be a better place without [her]," 236 it is
difficult to argue that a reasonable person receiving that message
would feel "fear of bodily harm or death."237 In the weeks following
230. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006).
231. R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 388.
232. Black, 538 U.S. at 361-62.
233. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
234. Ruedy, supra note 4, at 341.
235. Black, 538 U.S. at 360 (emphasis added).
236. Stelter, supra note 55, at A28.
237. Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
164 [Vol. 60:141
CYBERBULLYING 2.0
Megan Meier's suicide, Lori Drew actually experienced a true threat
as that term is defined in Black238 because multiple parties harassed
Drew by spreading her address, phone numbers, and satellite images
of her house across the Internet, as well as calling her with death
threats and throwing a brick into her kitchen.239 The Black true threat
standard could allow electronic messages stating, "I am going to kill
you" or "I am going to hurt you" to constitute a true threat if the
victim is placed in fear of imminent harm or death and the bully in-
tends for the victim to feel that fear.240 Proponents of cyberbullying
legislation must accept, however, that not all types of arguably intimi-
dating speech can be constitutionally proscribed through legislation,
especially not speech that is merely insulting or derogatory.241
The Cyberbullying Act's regulatory scope is limited by its requisite
mental state of intent. It expressly states that a punishable act of
cyberbullying must be committed "with the intent to coerce, intimi-
date, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress to a person." 242
By requiring specific intent, the Cyberbullying Act would only be en-
forceable against intentional intimidation, as defined in Black.243 Not
only must this intentional behavior be severe and hostile, it must also
occur on more than one occasion and must occur with the purpose to
coerce, intimidate, harass, or cause substantial emotional distress. 24 4
In Black, the court defined "intimidation" as a statement of intent to
commit an unlawful act of violence against a person or group of peo-
ple. 245 While this may not be the intimidation that Representative
Sanchez has in mind, 246 it is how the Court should interpret this provi-
sion based on Black, and given the lack of criminal authority protect-
ing one from "emotional distress," it is likely the Court will require
238. See id. at 348-49.
239. Schwartz, supra note 3, at 26.
240. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60.
241. Other countries do not agree. On February 16, 2010, a teenager in Indonesia was sen-
tenced to seventy-five days in prison for calling one of her romantic rivals a "pig," a "dog," and
"promiscuous and overweight" on Facebook. See Facebook Insult Leads to Conviction,
CBSNEWS.COM (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/02/17/tech/main6215149.
shtml.
242. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2009).
243. Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (explaining that true threats "encompass those statements where
the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlaw-
ful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals").
244. H.R. 1966 § 3(a).
245. Black, 538 U.S. at 360 ("Intimidation in the constitutionally proscribable sense of the
word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of persons
with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.").
246. H.R. 1966 § 3(a).
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that this emotional distress arise from truly threatening
intimidation. 247
While the threshold for proving intent with the Cyberbullying Act is
high, other aspects of the bill are not clearly defined and would likely
be struck down as overbroad. The Supreme Court stated that "[A]
law may be invalidated as overbroad if 'a substantial number of its
applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's
plainly legitimate sweep." 248 The Cyberbullying Act's problem is ex-
actly that. By not defining the terms "coerce," "intimidate," "harass,"
"substantial emotional distress," "severe," and "hostile behavior," this
bill would grant the government massive authority to punish speech
that the First Amendment protects.249 Troublingly, this bill would also
punish speech that had no effect on the person receiving the commu-
nication, creating an inchoate offense of cyberbullying. 250 The Su-
preme Court in United States v. Stevens made clear that it would not
whittle down broad language just to make legislation constitutionally
narrow, because to do so would be to intrude on the role of the legis-
lative branch.251 Thus, this proposed bill, while content neutral and
perhaps the least restrictive means of addressing cyberbullying, would
likely be struck down as overly broad.
The current cyberstalking section of the federal stalking statute is
more narrow than the Cyberbullying Act, and it is directed specifically
at constitutionally unprotected online speech. This federal crime of
cyberstalking requires engaging in a course of conduct using electronic
communication with intent "to kill, injure, harass, or place under sur-
veillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause sub-
stantial emotional distress," or with intent to place a person within a
"reasonable fear" of death or serious bodily injury, and to cause the
victim to feel "substantial emotional distress" or a "reasonable fear"
of death or serious bodily injury.252 Under the statute, the victim's
fear of death or serious bodily injury mirrors the Supreme Court's
interpretation of constitutionally proscribable "intimidation" in
247. See id.
248. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1587 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 443, 449 n.6 (2008)).
249. See Eugene Volokh, Federal Felony to Use Blogs, the Web, Etc. to Cause Substantial
Emotional Distress Through "Severe, Repeated, and Hostile" Speech?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIR-
ACY (Apr. 30, 2009, 4:07 PM), http://volokh.com/posts/1241122059.shtml. In his blog, Professor
Eugene Volokh outlines six seemingly preposterous new "crimes" this legislation would author-
ize the Government to punish. Id.
250. See H.R. 1966. Nowhere in this bill is a requirement that someone receive this communi-
cation, nor is it required that anyone be troubled by it at all. Id.
251. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1591-92.
252. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006).
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Black.2 5 3 Similar to the Cyberbullying Act, the context of "substantial
emotional distress" in this legislation is difficult to ascertain because
the term is not explained. 254 Unlike the Cyberbullying Act, the fed-
eral crime of stalking requires the victim to actually feel substantial
emotional distress, and it requires that the defendant's intent put the
victim in that mental state.255 Because the other terms in this stalking
statute have explanations that may be found in other areas of criminal
law or Supreme Court precedent, it would behoove Congress to de-
fine "substantial emotional distress" to avoid overbreadth concerns.
Thus, interpreted in light of Supreme Court precedent, the
Cyberbullying Act would likely be struck down as overly broad.
However, the current federal crime prohibiting cyberstalking more
narrowly defines its actus reus and serves to protect constitutional
speech.
C. A Federal Cyberbullying Crime Is the Least Restrictive Means of
Preventing Online Threats
Finally, cyberbullying criminalization will only be constitutional if it
is the least restrictive means by which the government may proscribe
the behavior. The least restrictive means requirement has dismantled
previous regulations of electronic communication, including the Com-
munications Decency Act of 1996256 and the Child Online Protection
Act.257 Commentators raise three principle arguments under the least
restrictive means test in regard to cyberbullying legislation: (1) parents
can control cyberbullying through monitoring their children's Internet
use;258 (2) schools can stifle cyberbullying through school-enforced
punishment;259 and (3) state laws can adequately control and punish
253. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) ("Intimidation in the constitutionally proscrib-
able sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or
group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.").
254. See generally H.R. 1966. The United States District Court for the Western District of
Louisiana recently held that a jury had sufficient evidence of "substantial emotional distress"
under 18 U.S.C. § 2261A when the government offered testimony that the victims refused to let
their children play outside and slept at night in shifts. See United States v. Clement, No. 09-
0337-01, 2010 WL 1812395, at *2 (W.D. La. May 3, 2010).
255. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
256. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 882-83 (1997).
257. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670 (2004) (upholding the trial court's injunction).
258. Ruedy, supra note 4, at 330, 346.
259. Kathleen Conn, Cyberbullying and Other Student Misuses of Technology Affecting K-12
Public Schools: Will Public School Administrators Be Held Responsible for the Consequences?,
244 EDUc. L. REP. 479, 486 (2009) ("Parents ... should have a reasonable expectation that
schools and school personnel will respond to cyberbullying, cyberharassment, and threats com-




cyberbullying. 260 While these alternatives may be less restrictive than
federal criminalization of cyberbullying, they are also less effective at
achieving the government's goal of protecting cyberbullying victims.
The following discussion shows that each of these alternatives is inad-
equate and that a federal cyberbullying statute is the first online
speech restriction that can pass the least restrictive means test.
1. Parental Monitoring of Children's Online Actions Is a Less
Effective Alternative to Federal Criminalization of
Cyberbullying
A common belief is that parents should be held responsible for
monitoring their children's Internet use to prevent them from being
victimized or from cyberbullying others. Parental monitoring of chil-
dren's Internet activity is a woefully inadequate solution to the prob-
lem of Internet cyberbullying. If the Cyberbullying Act is challenged
in court, the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v. Playboy would
require the government to show that parental enforcement is a less
effective means of protecting children from cyberbullying than federal
criminalization. 261 In Playboy, the Court said that parents could mon-
itor what their children see on television, and this would be less re-
strictive on adults who wish to view these programs.262
Times have changed since the Playboy decision in 2000. The Su-
preme Court acknowledged the Internet's rapid growth between 1998
and 2004,263 and it should now recognize its continued growth since
then. The Internet is now accessed through mobile phones, school
and public libraries, electronics stores, and wireless networks that pass
through walls and buildings.264 This is markedly different from the
situation in Playboy, a case that only concerned televisions that were
physically plugged in to cable television outlets in the home, making
these sources of entertainment relatively easy to monitor.265 Parents
cannot monitor all of their children's phone conversations, YouTube
uploads, social-networking interactions, and text messages. Beyond
260. Cyberbullying Legislation: Why Education Is Preferable to Regulation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism & Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th
Cong. 2 (2009) (testimony of Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Founda-
tion) [hereinafter Szoka & Thierer].
261. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824 (2000).
262. Id. at 825-26.
263. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 671 (2004).
264. Mandy Rogers, No Strings Attached: Wireless Technology Gaining in Popularity, QUAL-
rrY ClTIEs, May-June 2004, at 16, 17 ("If your wireless signal makes it out into your parking lot,
all an intruder would need to do is park his or her car, turn on a laptop and connect to your
network.").
265. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 807.
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the relative ease with which parents can observe their home television,
in Playboy Justice Breyer explained that parents could also call their
cable company and request to have any offensive channels removed
from their cable package. 266 Parents cannot call their Internet service
providers and request to have threats and harassment removed from
their Internet package. It is likewise difficult to imagine that parents
have the time to monitor their children's hours online, especially con-
sidering the average American spends sixty-eight hours per month on
the Internet. 267
The Supreme Court has applied the least restrictive means analysis
to Internet communication. In Ashcroft, the Court invalidated In-
ternet pornography regulations because parents could install filtering
software that blocks online pornography from reaching children. 268
The Court stated, "COPA [the Child Online Protection Act] presumes
that parents lack the ability, not the will, to monitor what their chil-
dren see. By enacting programs to promote use of filtering software,
Congress could give parents that ability without subjecting protected
speech to severe penalties."269 Private filtering could accomplish the
same purposes as regulation; as such, the Court found filtering
software to be a less restrictive alternative. 270 But cyberbullying is dif-
ferent-parents likely have the will to stop cyberbullying, but no
means exist to give parents the ability to stop cyberbullying. Unlike
pornography filters, filtering software cannot adequately prevent
cyberbullying from reaching children because it can neither analyze
context (such as a friend saying "I'm going to kill you" as opposed to a
stranger saying the same) nor discern Internet idioms (such as text
and numeric combination words like "r4p3"-a code for "rape"). 271
Furthermore, Web site administrators cannot monitor these communi-
cations due to the staff and time that would be required to screen
266. Id. at 841-42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
267. Average American Watches 153 Hours of TV & Online 68 Hours Per Month, CLEAN CUT
MEDIA (Oct. 25, 2009), http://cleancutmedia.com/Internet/you-watch-153-hours-of-tv-online-68-
hours.
268. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666-67, 671 (2004).
269. Id. at 670.
270. Id. at 666-70.
271. See URBAN DicrONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=r4p3 (last
visited Jan. 25, 2011). In a less grotesque example, Professor Susan Brenner, professor of crimi-
nal law and cybercrime at the University of Dayton School of Law, maintains a blog on cyber-
crime titled "CYB3RCRIM3." See Fraud and Interstate Commerce, CYB3RCRIM3, http://cyb3
rcrim3.blogspot.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
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every message. For example, Facebook cannot constantly monitor the
activity of its four hundred million users.272
2. School Punishment of Students' Online Actions Is a Less
Effective Alternative to Federal Criminalization of
Cyberbullying
Speech that occurs on school property, during school hours, or at
school-sponsored functions may currently be restricted in order to fur-
ther legitimate government interests, provided that those restrictions
are content neutral and the speech constitutes a material and substan-
tial disruption to school activities.273 Supporters of school discipline
as the means to target cyberbullies seize on the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Morse, which allowed the defendant's school to punish his off-
campus speech.274 These supporters also cite various federal appellate
court decisions that have permitted schools to regulate speech that
took place exclusively off campus. 275 As more cases appear in which
schools are allowed to punish off-campus speech that carries on-cam-
pus ramifications, some commentators suggest that cyberbullying is an
issue best left for schools to tinker with. 2 7 6 There is even alternative
legislation in the House of Representatives that would grant schools
additional funding to teach about cyberbullying awareness. 277
As a threshold issue, the Supreme Court in Morse did not hold that
schools could punish students generally for their off-campus speech.278
Distinguishing Bethel School District v. Fraser,279 the Morse Court
wrote that if the student "delivered the same speech [that the Court
allowed to be punished] in a public forum outside the school context,
it would have been protected." 280 Although the Supreme Court in
Morse allowed the school to punish off-campus speech, the Court rea-
272. Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Jan.
25, 2011).
273. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-13 (1969); see also
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513).
274. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 399-401 (explaining that the Court considered the student's ac-
tions to have transpired at a school function and disregarding the fact that this school function
was adjacent to, but not on, school property).
275. See, e.g., Duffy B. Trager, New Tricks for Old Dogs: The Tinker Standard Applied to
Cyber-Bullying, 38 J.L. & EDUc. 553, 558-59 (2009).
276. See, e.g., Szoka & Thierer, supra note 260, at 14 (pun intended).
277. See Adolescent Web Awareness Requires Education Act, H.R. 3630, 111th Cong. (2009);
Jacqui Cheng, Two Cyberbullying Bills Duke It out in House Committee, ARs TECHNICA (Oct. 1,
2009, 1:22 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/10/two-cyberbullying-bills-duke-it-
out-in-house-committee.ars.
278. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 393.
279. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
280. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405.
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soned that the speech in question occurred at a school function during
school hours.281 This holding provides no support for any school's
purported jurisdiction over off-campus Facebook conversations, in-
stant-messenger comments, and MySpace posts, provided these com-
ments are sent at non-school-related events and during non-school
hours. Additionally, it is not easy to obtain the location from which
messages on the Internet are sent. 2 8 2
Even if a school can determine from where a message was sent,
school punishment for cyberbullying is only plausible when the bully-
ing is "committed by kids against kids-not by adults against kids or
against other adults." 283 Logically, a school may not suspend, expel,
or give a detention to a non-student adult. 2 8 4 Additionally, school
punishment requires that both the cyberbully and the victim are stu-
dents of the same school, since a school's threats of suspension or ex-
pulsion would be of little deterrence to an adult such as Lori Drew. 2 8 5
Those who define cyberbullying as between "a minor on both sides"
suggest that when an adult becomes involved, "it is plain and simple
cyber-harassment or cyberstalking. Adult cyber-harassment or cyber-
stalking is NEVER called cyberbullying." 28 6 While this distinction
makes it easier to claim that schools should resolve cyberbullying mat-
ters by extending the Tinker doctrine, 287 the Megan Meier case is evi-
dence that cyberbullying is evolving, and its definition and proposed
regulations should expand accordingly. 288 The argument that schools
can punish this behavior is also misleading, as it implies that there are
currently cyberbullying, cyberharrassment, or cyberstalking laws in all
states. In reality, twenty states do not have such laws.2 8 9
281. Id. at 401.
282. For example, Facebook has permission to track its users' IP addresses. See Privacy Pol-
icy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2011). However,
Facebook states, "The most Facebook can provide [in response to a subpoena] is the basic sub-
scriber information for a particular account." Law Enforcement and Third-Party Matters,
FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=17158 (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
283. Szoka & Thierer, supra note 260, at 5.
284. Schools are allowed to suspend students during their final year of high school, even if
they are legally eighteen-year-old adults.
285. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 26 (explaining that Lori Drew was Megan Meier's forty-
seven-year-old neighbor who convinced Megan to kill herself).
286. STOP CYBERBULLYING.ORG, supra note 12.
287. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503. 507 (1969) ("[T]he Court has
repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority. . .of school officials
... to prescribe and control conduct in the schools." (emphasis added)).
288. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 26.
289. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 82, at 1.
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3. State Cyberbullying Legislation Is a Less Effective Alternative to
Federal Criminalization of Cyberbullying
Cyberbullying legislation only exists in a few states.290 Currently,
most state cyberbullying legislation is closely related to school-based
bullying legislation, while "[s]ome states say that local districts should
develop cyberbullying prevention programs[,] [although those states]
did not address the question of discipline." 291 States that have ex-
panded their public schools' disciplinary role are subject to the same
problems discussed in the previous section. Problems arise in states
like Missouri, Idaho, and Washington that require schools to report
incidents of cyberbullying to the police. 292 State police enforcement
of cyberbullying legislation generates a range of problems in imple-
mentation and consistency. These problems overshadow any benefits
of state police-based cyberbullying legislation.
The Internet unavoidably crosses state lines, thus creating an array
of jurisdictional issues with conflicting state standards. 293 For exam-
ple, if a student from South Dakota (a state with no bullying or
cyberbullying laws) 294 vacations in Arkansas (a state with school-en-
forced cyberbullying policies) 295 and repeatedly during this vacation
sends intentionally threatening Facebook messages to an acquaintance
who lives in North Carolina (a state with criminal cyberbullying poli-
cies), 296 is this student off the hook, as he would be in South Da-
kota? 297 Or is he a candidate for school-enforced "consequences," as
he would be in Arkansas? 298 Or perhaps he is subject to possible im-
prisonment, as he would be under North Carolina's cyberbullying
statute.299
The answer to these questions would be difficult enough under a
standard minimum-contacts analysis in civil litigation.300 Additional
uncertainty arises when analyzing requisite minimum contacts in an
290. Id.
291. Jan Hoffman, Online Bullies Pull Schools into the Fray, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2010, at Al.
292. See id.
293. Szoka & Thierer, supra note 260, at 9.
294. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 82, at 1.
295. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (2010).
296. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(a) (Supp. 2009).
297. See Hinduja & Patchin, supra note 82, at 1.
298. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(b)(3) (2007).
299. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1, § 14-3(a)(1)-(2).
300. Analyzing which state law applies to the perpetrator in this situation would require an
analysis of whether the cyberbully had sufficient minimum contacts with a forum state, in addi-
tion to traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
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online situation.301 While schools obviously cannot suspend residents
of other states, any state (such as North Carolina) that wishes to press
criminal charges against an out-of-state cyberbully may do so. 30 2 If
the purpose of cyberbullying legislation is to punish children, it should
not take a civil or criminal procedure scholar to ascertain when and
how punishment will be administered.
D. Abandoning the Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act and
Proposing the Megan Meier Amendments to the
Federal Crime of Stalking
The federal cyberstalking statute protects against the worst in-
stances of cyberbullying in a constitutionally valid manner, but two
amendments are needed to solidify the breadth and usefulness of this
regulation. The first required amendment was addressed earlier in
this Comment: a provision criminalizing speech that causes "substan-
tial emotional distress" needs to define that term or risk being struck
down as overly broad. The Supreme Court would likely refuse to re-
write this legislation to create a definition of "substantial emotional
distress," as such a rewrite would remove the "'incentive to draft a
narrowly tailored law in the first place."' 303 One possible solution
would be to adopt the definitions of emotional distress found in cer-
tain state statutes.304 Michigan, for example, defines criminally pun-
ishable emotional distress as "'significant mental suffering or distress
that may, but does not necessarily, require medical or other profes-
sional treatment or counseling."' 3 0 5  Michigan's definition only de-
fines emotional distress, so a federal crime based on substantial
emotional distress should at a minimum require a higher level of
trauma, perhaps by requiring medical treatment or professional
counseling.
301. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). In
Zippo, the court divides Internet contacts into three groups, each with a different level of ac-
countability online. Id. at 1124. For the purposes of general and personal jurisdiction, busi-
nesses that use the Internet are present everywhere that the Internet is found. Id. at 1122-24.
Databases, where a user simply posts information without any commerce purposes, are not sub-
ject to personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1124. Finally, between these two extremes, Web sites like
Wikipedia that have a give and take of information have questionable jurisdiction, based largely
on the level of interactivity and any commercial purposes of the Web site. Id.
302. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 87-93 (1985). It seems unlikely that a high school
student understands the dual sovereignty principles of criminal law under which he or she would
be prosecuted.
303. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010) (quoting Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 121 (1990)).
304. Susan W. Brenner & Megan Rehberg, "Kiddie Crime"? The Utility of Criminal Law in
Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2009).
305. See id. (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.411h(1)(b) (2004)).
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The second required amendment to the statute addresses jurisdic-
tion. Currently, the federal stalking statute requires that stalking be
directed at "a person in another State" to qualify as a federal crime.306
This negates the ability to use this legislation against anyone being
cyberbullied by someone within his same state. The federal stalking
statute should be amended to use the Cyberbullying Act's wording,
which avoids this problem semantically. The Cyberbullying Act states
that "[w]hoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce" any
cyberbullying communication would be guilty of a crime.307 Courts
have recently held that e-mail and online communication, even when
sent to someone "intrastate," qualify as "interstate" communication
because of the interstate locations of servers, networks, and other
electronic portals through which these messages pass.308 The legisla-
ture can address the many disturbing instances of cyberbullying that
occur between perpetrators and victims in the same state by reword-
ing the federal stalking statute to require interstate communication,
not a victim located in another state.309
Representative Sanchez could achieve the same results of her pro-
posed Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act by instead propos-
ing two amendments to the Cyberstalking Act that already covers a
great deal of cyberbullying. These two amendments would ensure a
constitutionally narrow interpretation of the federal stalking statute
and provide federal jurisdiction for online harassment between re-
sidents of the same state.
IV. IMPACT
The Cyberbullying Act may not be passed by the current Congress.
Nevertheless, this bill has been proposed before,310 and other
306. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006).
307. Megan Meier Cyberbullying Prevention Act, H.R. 1966, 111th Cong. (2009).
308. CYB3BCRIM3, supra note 271. In this entry, Professor Brenner discusses United States
v. Siembida, 604 F. Supp. 2d 589 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), in which defendants were convicted for send-
ing e-mail within a state that passed through an out-of-state server. Id. at 597. The federal wire
fraud statute requires "interstate" communication, and the court held that the e-mail server's
location in Pennsylvania established "interstate" communication. Id.
309. Some federal crimes are predicated on interstate communication, not an interstate divi-
sion between the defendant and the victim. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1343; 18 U.S.C. § 2251. The
application of "interstate" legislation to "intrastate" activity is considered constitutional. See,
e.g., Houston v. United States, 234 U.S. 342. 351-52 (1914); see also United States v. Kammer-
sell, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1196 (D. Utah 1998), affd, 196 F.3d 1137 (10th Cir. 1999).
310. See Andrew M. Henderson, High-Tech Words Do Hurt: A Modern Makeover Expands
Missouri's Harassment Law to Include Electronic Communications, 74 Mo. L. REV. 379, 394
(2009) (discussing the 2008 version of the Cyberbullying Act presented to the 110th Congress).
[Vol. 60:141174
CYBERBULLYING 2.0
cyberbullying bills are also being presented before Congress. 311 In the
meantime, states continue to create and revamp school cyberbullying
legislation, and certain states are making cyberbullying a crime. 312
Even in states without cyberbullying legislation, many schools are
punishing online speech.31 3 The time has come for Congress to decide
whether and how cyberbullying should be regulated.314
Whether or not cyberbullying is expressly criminalized at the fed-
eral level, states will continue to pass conflicting legislation to con-
front this potentially interstate problem. If current trends continue,
some states will require schools to punish cyberbullies, others will
criminalize the practice, and others will ignore it entirely. In states
with school-based cyberbully punishment, schools may require addi-
tional legislation that allows them to overcome the issue of Internet
anonymity. Schools cannot punish a cyberbully operating under a
pseudonym without first identifying the true offender.315
A future victim like Megan Meier will have no protection under
school-enforced cyberbullying punishments, the type of punishment
that comprises the majority of states' legislation. Megan Meier was
bullied by an adult acting under a pseudonym-two nearly insur-
mountable obstacles for school punishment. Even schools with man-
dates to punish cyberbullying cannot give an adult detention, nor can
they force an adult out of online anonymity. Without criminalized
cyberbullying, students who are harassed by adults using online pseud-
onyms will need to file tort suits, likely claiming intentional infliction
of emotional distress.316 Depending on the severity of the harassment,
students may also be protected under the federal stalking statute, pro-
vided their harasser is located in another state.317
With or without criminalized cyberbullying, a future cyberbully like
Lori Drew who suggests that a young girl kill herself has not commit-
311. See Cheng, supra note 277.
312. BULLY POLICE, supra note 1; see also Zetter, supra note 103. A Missouri girl was ar-
rested for creating a Web site and using it to offer pictures and disparaging commentary about
her classmate, calling her a "slut." See Zetter, supra note 103.
313. See, e.g., Hahn, supra note 71.
314. See generally Allison E. Hayes, Note, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v.
Nichoff Shows the Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 AKRON
L. REV. 247 (2010). Hayes rightly argues that the U.S. Supreme Court must offer "a more work-
able standard . . . in [this] emerging area of law that has not been re-evaluated since the days of
the Vietnam War." Id. at 289.
315. Neither can the federal or state government. But the government has an advantage over
schools. Addressing anonymous cyberbullying through statute allows the use of the discovery
process, while schools do not have a discovery process that would require Facebook or Google to
identify an anonymous user.
316. See Castle, supra note 16, at 593-94.
317. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006).
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ted a crime, even if the victim does in fact kill herself.318 Furthermore,
while it remains unclear what qualifies as "substantial emotional dis-
tress" under the federal stalking statute, Lori Drew still has not com-
mitted that crime because she and Megan Meier resided in the same
state. 319 Additionally, schools cannot punish someone like Lori Drew,
both because she is an adult and because she is hiding behind an on-
line pseudonym. However, with or without federal legislation, a
cyberbully like Lori Drew will likely face a civil claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 320
Lori Drew, however, was also a victim of serious harassment in the
months following Megan's death.321 Online malefactors seeking to
harm the Drew family spread the family's e-mail addresses, phone
numbers, and satellite images of their home across the Internet. 322
Lori Drew and her family received death threats and a brick through
their kitchen window. 323 Unknown attackers infiltrated Drew's
voicemail324 and a blog titled "Megan Had It Coming" was posted
online in Lori Drew's name. 325
If no federal cyberbullying legislation is passed, prosecutors will
likely file a series of charges to protect a future victim like Lori
Drew.32 6 Identity-theft statutes may protect a future Lori Drew in re-
gards to the changes to her voicemail message and the Web site set up
in her name.32 7 However, the federal identity-theft statute makes
identity theft a crime only when identity is stolen for the purpose of
committing other commercial crimes, and not all states have criminal-
ized the type of non-commercial identity theft that Lori Drew suf-
fered.328 Lori Drew would need to show that others were committing
crimes while purporting to be her.
A future victim like Lori Drew could also turn to state laws that
criminalize threats.329 It would be easier for prosecutors to claim that
Lori Drew was threatened by the death threats she received on the
phone than it would be for her to claim that she was threatened by the
318. See, e.g., People v. Campbell, 335 N.W.2d 27 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
319. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A.
320. See Castle, supra note 16, at 593-94.
321. See Schwartz, supra note 3, at 26-27.
322. Id. at 26.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 26-27.
326. For a list of criminal statutes prosecutors could use, see Brenner & Rehberg, supra note
304, at 16-23.
327. See id. at 73-78.
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.713 (2009).
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Web sites advocating violence against her, because the online threats
were not made specifically against her. All of this becomes more com-
plicated, however, by Internet anonymity.
At a minimum, Lori Drew was the victim of criminal property dam-
age when a brick was thrown through her window.3 30 Prosecutors
would need to decide whether the online discussions-namely the
spreading of photos of the Drews' home and the family's phone num-
bers-carried the requisite factors to establish criminal conspiracy.331
Finally, prosecutors could claim that Lori Drew was a victim of fed-
erally criminalized stalking.332 The government would have to show
that those who dissipated Lori Drew's information online, sent her
death threats, and set up a Web site in her name did so with the intent
"to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate, or cause[ ] [Lori Drew] substan-
tial emotional distress."333 Given the national attention Lori Drew
received, many of these communications may have come from other
states, giving the federal government jurisdiction under the current
federal stalking statute.334
If a cyberbullying bill similar to the Cyberbullying Act is passed, it
will most likely be challenged in court.335 In its current form, the
Cyberbullying Act remains unconstitutionally broad, and the Supreme
Court would likely strike down certain sections, or the entire law, for
overbreadth.336 Thus, an amended version of the current federal
stalking statute, further narrowing the bill and allowing intrastate ap-
plication, would be a favorable alternative to the Cyberbullying Act.
A hard truth remains: neither the Cyberbullying Act, nor the fed-
eral crime of stalking, protect Megan Meier. Megan Meier was not a
victim of a true threat, and she will not be protected by constitutional
cyberbullying or cyberstalking legislation. The Cyberbullying Act
would not punish all actions that have been labeled "cyberbullying,"
nor could it. The Cyberbullying Act cannot criminalize students call-
ing their peers "fat whores," nor would the proposed legislation im-
prison a student who tells a peer "the world would be a better place
without you." 3 3 7 These offenses will remain within the realm of
330. Mo. REV. STAT. § 569.120 (1999).
331. See Mo. REV. STAT. § 564.016 (1999 & Supp. 2010).
332. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261A (2006).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See Tucker, supra note 75.
336. See generally United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
337. Maag, supra note 6, at 9 (classmates of Megan Meier called her a "fat whore"); Stein-




school policy, parental monitoring, and ongoing public education on
cyberbullying.
Likewise, the federal crime of stalking does not negate the need for
state cyberbullying legislation. The federal government and state gov-
ernments already share concurrent jurisdiction regarding a variety of
issues. 338 An amended federal stalking statute, used concurrently with
state cyberbullying crimes, would ensure that cyberbullies who
threaten others online will be held accountable for their actions re-
gardless of their home state.
The best option to protect a future Megan Meier lies outside of the
realm of law. Most would admit that society would not be well served
by imprisoning every child who sends an angry, morally repugnant e-
mail, Facebook comment, or text message. Society cannot, however,
ignore a massive increase in anonymous Internet hate speech. Various
organizations have recognized this reality and are beginning to con-
front cyberbullying with much-needed information campaigns and
publicity, raising awareness of cyberbullying's seriousness and tragic
outcomes.339 This approach has worked before. Public awareness
campaigns have taken smoking out of restaurants, turned racists into
outcasts, and may have even saved the earth's ozone layer from dam-
aging aerosol sprays. Relentlessly ostracizing those who cyberbully on
the Internet may be the nation's best and only way to end non-threat-
ening cyberbullying. 340 A future Megan Meier may not be protected
by a federal or state statute, but perhaps the general public can work
together to save cyberbullying's next victim before it is too late.
V. CONCLUSION
Cyberbullying (and cyberstalking) can and should be regulated-
but this regulation must be narrow. A cyberbullying statute cannot be
limited to protecting certain groups-it may not specifically prohibit
cyberbullying instigated due to age, race, gender, religion, socioeco-
nomic status, or other specific classifications.341 If a federal cyberbul-
lying statute proscribes "intimidation," courts will require this
intimidation to place a victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury or
338. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2006).
339. See, e.g., Cyberbullying, NATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, http://www.ncpc.org/
cyberbullying (last visited Jan. 25, 2011); CYBERBULLYING-LAUGH AT IT AND YOU'RE PART OF
IT, http://yp.direct.gov.uk/cyberbullying/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011); see also STOP BULLYING
Now!, http://www.stopbullyingnow.hrsa.govkids/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
340. Professor Susan Brenner suggests that some other state and federal laws may also punish
certain instances of cyberbullying. Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 304.
341. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992).
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death, 34 2 not in fear of being teased or having their lunch money sto-
len. Finally, a federal cyberbullying statute must be more effective
than any other conceivable means of prohibiting cyberbullying 343 -
more effective than parental monitoring, filtering software, school
punishment, or state enforcement.
The Cyberbullying Act is overly broad, but an amended federal
stalking statute would protect threatened cyberbullying victims. Fed-
eral stalking legislation is already content neutral, but it must be
amended to clearly define what constitutes "substantial emotional dis-
tress" and to apply to intrastate communication transmitted through
interstate commerce. This federal statute is the least restrictive means
of achieving the nation's goal of ending cyberbullying because parents
and filters cannot adequately monitor the highly-accessible Internet,
schools can only punish their own students while those students are
within school, and state criminalization of cyberbullying alone creates
a dangerous double-standard, generating confusion as to when and
where cyberbullying is a criminal act.
The Internet is a Pandora's box that cannot be closed. National
laws must evolve with this new technology. Cyberbullies who
threaten and harass others cannot cower behind generic claims of
"free speech," as constitutional free speech is not entirely without re-
strictions. The memory of Megan Meier would be well served by
amending the federal stalking statute to protect the most abused
cyberbullying victims. While bullying is traditionally understood as a
childhood problem, the Internet provides a cloak of user anonymity,
allowing children to be faced with grown-up evils at an immature age.
Congress must make a grown-up decision, utilizing constitutional ma-
turity, and protect Internet users from those who wish to abuse soci-
ety's advances in communication.
Christopher S. Burrichter*
342. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
343. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 668-70 (2004).
* J.D. Candidate 2012, DePaul University College of Law; Bachelor of Arts 2008, Illinois
Wesleyan University. Thank you to Professor John F. Decker and Professor David L. Franklin
for illuminating the ever-tumultuous relationship between constitutional and criminal law.
Thank you to God for Your omnipotence and to my family for your ceaseless love and advice.
Finally, thank you most especially to Ingrid, my brilliant wife and closest friend-a million foot-
notes could never say how much I love you.
2010] 179
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:141180
